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When Appearance Matters: Reapportionment Under the
Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno
I. INTRODUCTION
In announcing its opinion in Shaw v. Reno,' the Supreme Court of the
United States introduced a new hurdle into the realm of well-settled jurispru-
dence regarding reapportionment. A majority of five justices created an
"analytically distinct claim,"'2 enabling them to conclude that appellants, white
voters in North Carolina, had stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lack of jurisprudential authority for the
majority opinion and the intentional ambiguity in its language result from what
the four dissenting justices accurately term an abandonment of the Court's prior
precedent concerning reapportionment.
In the arena of voting rights, there have traditionally been only two types of
claims recognized as arising under the Constitution: total exclusion from the
electoral process and vote dilution. Shaw creates an amorphous third category
by holding that voters have stated a claim if a districting plan "is so extremely
irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate
the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficient compelling justification." 3 If the above claim
cannot be contradicted on remand, the state has the burden of proving that the
redistricting plan is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
However, the Court gives little guidance as to how a state might satisfy this
burden.
While recognizing that race is always taken into account when creating new
districts-especially when the Voting Rights Act of 1965" is implicated-the
Court is placing a limit on how states may design a plan to comply with the Act.
The Supreme Court is limiting the extent to which traditional districting
principles, such as compactness, contiguity, and communities of interest, can be
sacrificed to comply with the Voting Rights Act, or to satisfy other legitimate
state interests, such as incumbency protection and partisan politics.
Taking race into account is not a new phenomenon in constructing districts.
It is difficult to conceive of a redistricting plan, drawn to remedy an objection
entered by the Attorney General as violating the Voting Rights Act, that fails to
use race as a factor-if not the sole factor-in designing the new district. As
Justice Brennan stated, "It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations
do not enter into apportionment decisions."'
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
2. Id. at 2830.
3. Id. at 2824.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988 & Stipp. V 1993).
5. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 176 n.4, 97 S. Ct. 996,
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Shaw v. Reno attempts to remove race as the domipant factor in redistricting
and to increase the influence of what the majority calls traditional districting
principles. The problem with the majority opinion is it attempts to do this
without reaching the ultimate question-the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. The majority insists that traditional districting principles such as compact-
ness be taken into account even at the expense of racial considerations.
However, the majority fails to reconcile how a remedial response to a violation
of the Voting Rights Act, which in all practicality must use race to remedy the
violation, may at the same time be constitutional under the reasoning of Shaw.
This casenote will illustrate how this double standard has left courts and
states caught between the will of Congress, the Voting Rights Act, and the will
of the Court, Shaw v. Reno. Part II will analyze the history of the Voting
Rights Act. Part III describes the background of Shaw, while Part IV illustrates
the divergence that Shaw creates in the jurisprudence and the majority's
underlying rationale for its decision. Lastly, Part V explores the situation that
Shaw creates for states, and specifically the constitutionality of Louisiana's
Fourth Congressional District, the subject of Hays v. Louisiana.6
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965'
A. History of the Act 8
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (hereinafter the Act) was enacted as a
specific statutory provision, in addition to the constitutional provisions of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, to protect the fundamental right to vote
announced by the Court in Reynolds v. Sins.9 Litigation of voting rights claims
on a case-by-case basis under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964
attempted to remedy unconstitutional voting practices but had only negligible
success, resulted in only piecemeal gains, was costly and time consuming, and
was thwarted by the development of new voting practices abridging or denying
the minority right to vote.'0 Congress responded with a blanket legislative
1015 n.4 (1977) (Brennan. J.. concurring in part).
6. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. For a more thorough analysis of this Act's history, see Steve Barber et al., Comment, The
Purging of Empowernent: Voter Purge Laws and the Voting Rights Act. 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
483 (1988); Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election Structures:
Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 La. L. Rev. 851 (1982); Suzanne G. Marsh,
Comment, Judges as Representatives Under the Votitg Rights Act, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 331 (1992);
Dr. James McClellan, Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome Buns: The Case Against the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 La. L. Rev. 5 (1981); Dotti C. Venable, Chisom v. Roemer: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 985 (1992); Amy S. Weed, Comment, Getting Around
the Voting Rights Act: The Supreme Court Sets the Limits of Racial Discrimination in the South, 10
B.C. Third World L.J. 381 (1990).
9. 377 U.S. 533, 561-62. 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1381 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is
a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.")
10. Barber et al., supra note 8, at 488.
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prohibition against discriminatory practices. The Act provided for administrative
relief and shifted responsibility from the courts to the Department of Justice.
B. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act"
Section 2 of the Act, as amended in 1982,2 forbids the application of any
"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) [hereinafter Section 2].
§ 1973. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color through
voting qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of violation
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973b(O(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
(as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982)).
12. The 1982 amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), changed the burden
of proof that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to establish a violation of Section 2. The old Section
2 provided that: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976) (emphasis
added).
This language was interpreted by the Supreme Court to require that plaintiffs prove the challenged
voting practice was intentionally discriminatory or "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e]"
for discrimination. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1499 (1980) (quoting
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 1872 (1971)).
The 1982 amendment replaced the italicized language above with the words "in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (emphasis added). As the revised
language and the legislative history of the amendment clearly suggest, "the specific intent of [the
Section 2] amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without
proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on S. 1992, S.
Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-06.
For a more thorough treatment of the 1982 amendment of Section 2, see James Forman, Jr.,
Victory By Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 10
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 133 (1992); James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 633
(1983); Roy A. McKenzie et al., Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Analysis of the 1982
Amendment, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 155 (1984); Evelyn E. Shockley, Note, Voting Rights Act
Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and the Minority Community's Representative of Choice, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1038 (1991).
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... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote on account
of race or color"'3 or because of membership in a "language minority group."' 4
A violation is established if members of any of the above groups "have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."' s The extent of any of a
violation remedy is expressly limited by Congress: "nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population."'
16
C. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act17
Section 5 was intended to "eradicat[e] the continuing effects of past
discrimination" in covered jurisdictions and to "insure that old devices for
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) (hereinafter Section 5].
§ 1973c. Alteration of voting qualifications and procedures; action by State or political
subdivision for declaratory judgment of no denial or abridgement of voting rights; three-
judge district court; appeal to Supreme Court
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth
in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence
of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 f, November 1, 1968
or November 1, 1972], such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title,
and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right
to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure: Provided That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate
official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has
not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause
shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the
Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made.
Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General
affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period
following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to
reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the
remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance
with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court
1338 [Vol. 54
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disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by new ones."' 8  The
enactment of Section 5 was an "uncommon exercise" of legislative authority,"'
but was necessary to effectively combat racial discrimination, which could not
be done with Section 2 alone. The legislative history of Section 5 reveals its
purpose:
Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of
staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discrimina-
tory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down....
Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, "to
shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil
to its victim," by "freezing election procedures in the covered areas
unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.
20
Section 5 applies only to "covered jurisdictions." A "covered jurisdiction"
is one in which Section 4(b) of the Act' applies because of a systematic
exclusion of minorities from the electoral process.22
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(enacted by Pub. L. No. 89-110, Title I, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (1965)).
18. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 141. 103 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6, 12, 44 (1982)).
19. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334, 86 S. Ct. 803, 822 (1966).
20. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363 (1976) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 57-58 (1975)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) [hereinafter Section 4]. The relevant portion of this section provides:
this section provides:
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any
political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on
November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing
therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such
persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964. On and after August 6,
1970, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject
to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous sentence, the provisions of
subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a
State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1968, any
test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that
less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on
November 1, 1968, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the
presidential election of November 1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in addition to any
State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this
section pursuant to the previous two sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the
Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and
with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per
centum of the citizens of voting age were registered on November 1, 1972. or that less
than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the Presidential election of November 1972.
22. See supra note 17 for text of Section 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c) incorporating
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Section 5 acts as a preventive measure. For example, when a covered
jurisdiction enacts a new or revised "voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," it must obtain
approval before implementation of the plan either by instituting an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment or by seeking approval of the Attorney General.23 States generally
choose the latter method because it is less costly and less time consuming. The
standard of proof for either of the above procedures is that "such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color."24
Under Section 5, new or revised reapportionment plans must be approved
by one of the methods discussed above.' An "effect" of a new or revised
reapportionment plan that would prohibit its implementation is defined as one
that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."'  This standard is
commonly called the principle of "nonretrogression." This standard ensures only
what its label (nonretrogression) ordinarily means, that the protected group will
not experience a decrease in its effect on the electoral franchise. The principle
guarantees maintenance of the status quo, not an increase in voting power.
Shaw v. Reno is inextricably related to the Voting Rights Act. In Shaw, the
redistricting plan challenged by voters resulted from North Carolina's attempt to
comply with the Act. The Court's resolution of Shaw creates a tension between
the mandates of the Act as perceived by the state and the mandates of the
Constitution as perceived by the Court.
III. BACKGROUND OF SHAW V. RENO
A. The Facts
As a result of population increases reflected in the 1990 Decennial Census, the
General Assembly of North Carolina reapportioned the state's congressional
districts, gaining an additional seat in the process. The original redistricting plan,
enacted on July 9, 1991, created a twelfth district (the First District), that had a
Section 4(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973b) as the standard for a "covered jurisdiction." See also
Blumstein, supra note 12, at 680-88.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
24. Id.
25. [U]nder § 5, new or revised reapportionment plans are among those voting procedures,
standards, or practices that may not be adopted by a covered State without the Attorney
General's or a three-judge court's ruling that the plan "does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 157, 97 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1977).




majority of black persons of voting age and registered to vote. This "majority-
minority" district was centered in the northeastern part of the state."
The General Assembly submitted the redistricting plan to the Attorney General
for preclearance in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Section 5). Forty of North
Carolina's one-hundred counties are considered "covered jurisdictions," a fact
which places them under Section 5 of the Act.
The Attorney General entered a formal objection to the proposed plan on the
ground that "the proposed configuration of the district boundary lines in the south-
central to southeastern part of the state appeared to minimize minority voting
strength given the significant minority population in this area of the state."" More
specifically, the Attorney General asserted that the General Assembly "chose not
to give effect to black and Native-American voting strength in this area, even
though it seems that boundary lines that were no more irregular than found
elsewhere in the proposed plan could have been drawn to recognize such minority
concentration in this part of the state."' 3 Further, with regard to the one majority-
minority district created in the proposed redistricting plan, it was noted that
[t]he unusually convoluted shape of that district does not appear to have
been necessary to create a majority black district and, indeed, at least one
alternative configuration was available that would have been more
compact. Nonetheless, we have concluded that the irregular configuration
of that district did not have the purpose or effect of minimizing minority
voting strength in that region."
In response to the Attorney General's objection, the General Assembly enacted
the redistricting plan that is the subject matter of Shaw v. Reno on January 24,
1992.32 The revised plan created a second majority-minority district, the Twelfth
District, not in the south-central to southeastern part of the state as suggested, but
in the north-central region along Interstate 85.
The shapes of the two majority-minority districts contained in the revised plan
gave rise to the claim in Shaw and to some very imaginative and colorful
descriptions in judicial opinions and commentaries. District One was described as
"a bug splattered on a windshield"" and a "Rorschach ink-blot test." 34 The
majority in Shaw described it as "hook shaped... with finger-like extensions., 3
28. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
29. Id. (quoting Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
to Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991)).
30. Id
31. Id. at 463 n.2. This is the standard for preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1981).
32. See infra Appendix A for a diagram of the North Carolina plan.
33. Political PornographyIl, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14.
34. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461,476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in part).
35. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
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District Twelve is an even better example of what has been termed
"computer-generated pornography."' 6 It is approximately 160 miles long and
"slinks down the Interstate Highway 85 corridor until it gobbles in enough
enclaves of black neighborhoods. ' 37  Most attention has been drawn to the
manner in which the new district follows the path of an interstate highway.
According to the Shaw majority, "[N]orthbound and southbound drivers on 1-85
sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to 'trade'
districts when they enter the next county. ' 3 As one state legislator commented,
"'If you drove down the 'interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of
the people in the district.'
' 39
B. The District Court Decision
White voters originally brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against various
federal and state officials challenging the congressional redistricting plan for
North Carolina.' Their claim alleged that the state created an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander. Specifically, the claims alleged that the federal defendants
had either misinterpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), as amended, and consequently
applied it unconstitutionally; or, if correctly interpreted, "had applied a facially
unconstitutional provision of the Act to accomplish an unconstitutional end.'
The alleged unconstitutional end for either of the above theories is "the
intentional concentration of majority populations of black voters in districts that
are in no way related to considerations of compactness, [contiguity], or jurisdic-
tional communities of interest.,
42
These claims were dismissed by the lower court on two grounds. First, the
court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). 43 Section 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act confers exclusive
original jurisdiction of a claim such as plaintiffs' upon the District Court for the
District of Columbia." The court stated as additional grounds for dismissal
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 45 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Morris v.
Gressette," preclearance decisions made by the Attorney General under Section
36. Political Pornography, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at A10. See infra Appendix A for a map
of the district.
37. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 476 (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in part).
38. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821.
39. Joan Biskupic, North Carolina Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters
Challenge Black-Majority Map, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4.
40. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
41. Id. at 465.
42. Id
43. Id. at 467.
44. Id. at 466-67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
45. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. N.C. 1992).
46. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 506 n.23, 97 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 n.23 (1977).
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5 of the Voting Rights Act are discretionary and are not subject to judicial
review in any court. The court concluded that the voters were, in effect, seeking
judicial review of discretionary decisions of the Attorney General; therefore, they
failed to state a cognizable claim for relief.
The allegation against the state defendants was essentially that "the General
Assembly ef North Carolina acted unconstitutionally in deliberately creating two
congressional districts in which black persons constitute majorities of the overall
voting-age and registered-voter populations. 47 The above allegation can be
broken down into two claims. First, the plaintiffs claimed that "any state
legislative redistricting driven by considerations of race-whatever the race,
whatever the specific purpose, whatever the specific effect-is unconstitutional"
and "to the extent the Voting Rights Act authorizes any race-conscious legislative
redistricting, the Act is facially unconstitutional."48  Second, the plaintiffs
alleged that to the extent the redistricting plan attempts to provide for proportion-
al representation of minority races in Congress and fails to observe "consider-
ations of contiguity, compactness, and communities of interest," the plan
constitutes an unconstitutional application of the Voting Rights Act.49
The voters' allegations enumerated above are based on statutory (Voting
Rights Act) as well as constitutional provisions. The constitutional provisions
on which the complaint is based are: the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Fifteenth Amendment; the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Article I, Section 2; and Article I, Section
4." The court promptly dispensed with the latter three claims and limited its
analysis to the Equal Protection Clause, into which the Fifteenth Amendment
claim was subsumed.5'
Two important factors that the court appropriately took special note of were:
first, plaintiffs are white voters; and second, it is not disputed that race was taken
into account in designing the redistricting plan at issue. 2
47. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 467.
48. IU at 468 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 468.
50. The district court disposed of plaintiffs' claims based on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 4, as either not applicable to plaintiffs'
claim or not affording plaintiffs the relief they sought. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 468-69.
51. One may ask why this is not a Fifteenth Amendment case. In Shaw v. Barr, the Fifteenth
Amendment challenge was considered together with the Equal Protection claim. In both racial
gerrymandering claims and vote dilution claims, the analysis is the same. The analysis is whether
"state action... invidiously discriminates against the voting rights of some of the states' citizens on
account of their race." Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 469-70 n.7. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
621, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3277 (1982) (stating that a showing of racially motivated discrimination is
required in an equal protection vote dilution claim); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S.
Ct. 1858, 1872 (1971) (proof that districts were "conceived or operated as purposeful devices" to
further discrimination is required to establish violation of the equal protection clause). See also
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1497 (1980) (plurality opinion) (facially race-
neutral state action violates Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose).
52. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 470.
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In rejecting the plaintiffs' first claim that race-conscious redistricting is per
se unconstitutional, the court applied the leading case in the area of redistricting
that is directly on point with Shaw:53 United Jewish Organizations of Williams-
burgh, Inc. v. Carey.-4
The plaintiffs' second contention was twofold. First, the state cannot do any
more than is required by the Voting Rights Act. The basis of this allegation is
that compliance with the Voting Rights Act did not require the creation of two
majority-minority districts. Second, the minority voters for whom these districts
were drawn must prove entitlement to the districts. The plaintiffs allege that a
minority group is entitled to a district in which they constitute the majority only
if, among other factors, a compact district can be created. 5 The district court,
however, did not rest its decision on the issue of compactness or on the limit of
the state's remedial power under the Voting Rights Act. Instead, it emphasized
that the white voters could not prove "that the redistricting plan was adopted
with the purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters such as
plaintiffs on account of their race."56 Specifically, the plaintiffs could not prove
that the redistricting plan had the purpose and would have the effect of
minimizing minority voting strength in the region.
In a separate opinion, Chief District Judge Voorhees concurred in the result
reached on the unconstitutional per se issue and that United Jewish Organiza-
tions disposed of this issue. However, Judge Voorhees stated that there are
limits to what United Jewish Organizations authorizes. He described these limits
as: "[T]ime-honored, constitutional concepts of districting, such as contiguity,
compactness, communities of interest, residential patterns, and population
equality." 57 Judge Voorhees' conclusion anticipated the majority's theme in
Shaw v. Reno: "Moreover, it could hardly have been the intent of Congress to
permit elevation of the racial criterion to the point of exclusion of all other
factors of constitutional dimension, such as contiguity, compactness, and
communities of interest, which bear on the rights of these Plaintiffs.""
53. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 470-72.
54. 430 U.S. 144, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977). For a more in depth treatment of United Jewish Orgs.
of Williamsburgh, Inc., see infra discussion at 1348-49.
55. The compactness precondition to a violation of Section 2 is from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 nn. 16-17, 106 S. Ci. 2752, 2766-67 nn. 16-17
(1986). As Justice Marshall explained:
The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must show, as a threshold
matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a single-member district is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim
to have been injured by that structure or parctice.
Id. at 50 n.17, 106 S. Ct. at 2766 n.17.
56. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 472. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at
165-68, 97 S. Ct. at 1009-12 (plurality opinion); id. at 179-80, 97 S. Ct. at 1016-17 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
57. Shaw, 808 F. Supp at 476 (Voorhees, J., dissenting in part).
58. ld. at 480 (footnote omitted).
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,59 the white voters
alleged that North Carolina's redistricting plan constitutes an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander. The question presented was whether appellants had stated
a cognizable claim. The Court answered yes, reversing the district court and
holding that the appellants had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted
under the Equal Protection Clause.60
In the history of Voting Rights litigation, never has a complaint such as the
one presented by the North Carolina voters been held to state a cognizable
claim, until Shaw. How the Court analyzed the allegations to reach such a
conclusion is worthy of keen scrutiny.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SHAW V. RENO
A. The Nature of the Claim
The specific nature of the appellants' claim is essential to an understanding
of Shaw v. Reno. Appellants claim neither that they are excluded from
participation in the electoral process, nor that the redistricting plan dilutes the
voting strength of white voters. Quite simply, appellants claim that "the
deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race
violated their constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral
process.",
61
By so classifying their claim, appellants attempt to take this case out of the
redistricting arena, which has always been treated as a sui generis category in the
context of racial classifications, requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose
and effect (absent which, no claim could be stated),62 and treat it as an ordinary
race case which must withstand strict scrutiny, eliminating the need to prove
discriminatory purpose or effect. Redistricting cases, although admittedly the
result of a racial classification, were exempt from strict scrutiny before Shaw
because the reapportionment process under the Voting Rights Act necessitates the
63
use of racial criteria.
59. In an action challenging a redistricting plan, any appeal is directly to the Supreme Court
of the United States: there is no appellate level review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) ("and any appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court.").
60. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
61. Id. at 2824 (1993).
62. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986); United Jewish Orgs.
of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 764, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 2338-39 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S. Ct. 1858,
1872 (1971); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58, 84 S. Ct. 603 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 341, 81 S. Ct. 125, 127 (1960).
63. [T]he Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from
deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure
that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5. That proposition must be rejected and §
5 held unconstitutional to that extent if we are to accept petitioners' view that racial criteria
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Appellants use the appearance of the new districts as the basis for their
claim. They object to "redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on
its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races
for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and
without sufficiently compelling justification." 64
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority places a limit on how states may redistrict-whether cloaked
in terms of remedying a violation of the Voting Rights Act or otherwise. How
the Court finds authority for placing limits on what states may do to remedy a
violation of the Voting Rights Act is both an exercise of imagination and
ambiguity. The majority begins its analysis of "relevant" authority with the
following: "Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on
its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' demands the same
close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Our
voting rights precedents support that conclusion."'6 First, it is unnecessary for
the majority to analyze whether the district can be explained on grounds other
than race for the purpose of determining that the district was drawn with race in
mind. All parties concede that race was taken into account in constructing the
plan. Second and most importantly, the "voting rights precedents" that the
majority refers to as supporting its 'conclusion are distinguishable. The principal
cases relied on are Guinn v. United States,6 Gomillion v. Lightfoot,67 Wright
v. Rockefeller,6 and, ironically, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh,
Inc. v. Carey.
1. The Court's Authority
Although Guinn and Gomillion were Fifteenth Amendment cases and Shaw
is a Fourteenth Amendment case, this alone is not enough to distinguish them.
The lower court in Shaw v. Barr specifically concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides greater protection than the
may never be used in redistricting or that they may be used, if at all, only as a specific
remedy for past unconstitutional apportionments. We are unwilling to overturn our prior
cases, however.
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at 161, 97 S. Ct. at 1007. See, e.g., Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1364 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States,
422 U.S. 358, 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S. Ct. 817
(1969).
64. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
65. Id. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266, 97 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1977)).
66. 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926 (1915).
67. 364 U.S. 339, 81 S. Ct. 125 (1960).
68. 376 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 603 (1964).
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Fifteenth Amendment and, therefore, disposed of the two claims under a single
analysis.69 Further, in Gomillion, Justice Whittaker stated that "the decision
should be rested not on the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."7 The Supreme Court has
frequently affirmed the correctness of Justice Whittaker's view.
71
Guinn is distinguishable as a total exclusion case. The statute in question
imposed a literacy requirement but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to
individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1,
1866."7' The effect of the statute was to exclude voters-especially blacks-from
the voting process. The appellants in Shaw have not been so excluded.
Like Guinn, Gomillion is also a pre-Voting Rights Act case and a total
exclusion case. Gomillion concerned a statute that changed the municipal
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama from a square to a twenty-eight-sided
figure with the effect of eliminating from the city all but "four or five of its 400
Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident." 73 The Court
specifically recognized that the intent of the legislature was to deprive black
citizens of the right to vote with the incidental result of changing the city's
boundaries.74
The majority in Shaw particularly draws its support from a concurring opinion
in Gomillion by Justice Whittaker. Justice Whittaker disagreed with resting the
Court's decision on the Fifteenth Amendment, 7 but instead maintained that the
decision should be based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the "State's purpose ... of 'fencing Negro citizens out of'
Division A and into Division B is an unlawful segregation of races of citizens. 76
Thus, Justice Whittaker argued racial segregation alone is sufficient to constitute
a cognizable claim.
Wright v. Rockefeller is also distinguishable from Shaw because the plan in
question in Wright did not result from attempted compliance with the Act.
However, Wright is in line with the majority's treatment of Shaw as a typical
69. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp 461, 469-70 n.7 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
70. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349, 81 S. Ct. at 131 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
.71. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S. Ct. 2282,
2293 (1979); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 1872 (1971). See also Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 1509 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 357, 35 S. Ct. 926, 928 (1915).
73. Gorillion, 364 U.S. at 341, 81 S. Ct. at 127.
74. Id. at 347, 81 S. Ct. at 130.
75. Justice Whittaker defines the right to vote as "the same right to vote as is enjoyed by all
others within the same election precinct, ward or other political division." Id. at 349, 81 S. Ct. at 131.
Thus, if according to the new municipal boundaries certain citizens are placed outside of the precinct,
they have no right to vote that can be denied or abridged and therefore, no right protected by the
Fifteenth Amendment. This is the case even if the redistricting plan was drawn "by the State for the
purpose of placing a racial group of citizens in Division B rather than A." Id., 81 S. Ct. at 131 This
same principle would deny appellants in Shaw of a Fifteenth Amendment claim.
76. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348, 81 S. Ct. at 132 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S. Ct. 686, 692 (1954)).
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race case. The issue to be decided in Wright was whether the appellants
sustained their burden of proving that the State's redistricting plan "segregate[d]
eligible voters by race and place of origin in violation of the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment."77 Like Shaw, Wright was not an exclusion case, nor did
the plaintiffs allege vote dilution. The Court rejected the appellants' claim in
Wright because they failed to prove that the "New York Act was the product of
a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.'
Because minorities who were claiming overrepresentation in one district and
underrepresentation in three other districts were located in one area of the county
that was being reapportioned, therefore, making it difficult geographically to
distribute minorities among several districts, the Court concluded that appellants
had not proven intent to segregate along racial lines. As the lower court stated,
the location of the minority group "made it difficult, even assuming it to be
permissible, to fix districts so as to have anything like an equal division of these
voters among the districts."79 The majority in Shaw has since answered this
question of whether it would be permissible to construct districts in a manner
that would give minorities voting strength in several districts by overlooking
compact locations of these minority groups. The answer is no.
The dissent in Wright forms the basis of the majority's argument. The two
main premises of the dissent are: first, neighborhoods cannot be disregarded in
the drawing of electoral districts; and, second, segregating voters along racial
lines promotes polarized voting.' ° These premises are essentially what the Court
implicitly concludes are the discriminatory purpose and effect, respectively, of
the redistricting plan in Shaw.
Justice Goldberg's dissent in Wright clearly states that no discriminatory
effect is needed when there is racial segregation: "Given this settled principle
that state-sanctioned racial segregation is unconstitutional per se, a showing of
serious under-representation or other specific harm to individual complainants is
irrelevant.""' Given the Shaw majority's reliance on the dissent in Wright, the
above quoted language could indicate that although the Court in Shaw intimated
that discriminatory purpose and effect were present, they might not be necessary
to state a claim. Indeed, this seems to be the logical conclusion of Shaw because
if districting plans that use race as a factor must satisfy strict scrutiny, questions
of purpose and effect are irrelevant. What is obvious, however, is that if the
Court requires a showing of effect in order to state a claim, it will be analyzed
on a less rigorous standard under Shaw than was required previously in voting
77. Id. at 56, 84 S. Ct' at 605.
78. Id. at 58, 84 S. Ct. at 606.
79. Id. at 57, 84 S. Ct. at 606 (footnote omitted).
80. Md at 59, 67, 84 S. Ct. at 607, 611 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Id at 69, 84 S. Ct. at 612 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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cases. To state a cause of action, all the plaintiffs need to show by way of harm
(effect) is that a standard based on race was used.82
The plaintiffs in Gomillion and Wright alleged that voters had been
segregated on the basis of race. Before the Voting Rights Act, this run-of-the-
mill race case might have stated a cause of action. But the Voting Rights Act
necessitates the use of race as a factor in reapportionment. Otherwise, the Act
is useless and must be declared unconstitutional. Therefore, the majority is
accurate in its reliance on Gomillion and Wright as race cases, but the majority
should nevertheless distinguish Shaw from these cases because the challenged
reapportionment plan in Shaw is a result of compliance with the Act, unlike the
plans challenged in Gomillion and Wright. The Court's reliance on Gomillion
and Wright and its misused reliance of the case most directly on point, United
Jewish Organizations, are unsound.
The majority argues that classifications based on race perpetuate actions
taken by many to disenfranchise and stigmatize voters because of their race. But
this is precisely why Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act-because states
were still attempting to use practices such as those in Gomillion and Wright to
block minority voters out of the process. The Voting Rights Act envisions using
race as a factor to remedy the effects of such practices. At the same time, the
Voting Rights Act does not authorize injury to majority voters in the process.
If a majority voter has been injured in the redistricting process, he would have
a remedy under the Equal Protection Clause. Absent any injury, he does not
state a cognizable claim.
The claim in Shaw presents an antinomy between two equally valid
principles: one, that racial classifications are inherently suspect and require strict
scrutiny and; two, that remedial devices such as the Voting Rights Act that
require racial classifications are necessary to ensure equal minority participation
in the electoral process. The majority's idealism has caused it to resolve this
seemingly unresolvable conflict without regard to practical realities.
The Voting Rights Act was enacted to provide a statutory framework for
resolving cases such as Wright. After "repeatedly try[ing] to cope with the
problem by facilitating case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination,"83
Congress became dissatisfied with the approach of finding instances of
unconstitutional discrimination and imposing various remedies in specific
situations." Thus, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to provide a
prophylactic measure against voting discrimination. Shaw diminishes, if not
aleviates, the significance of the Act for cases such as Wright.
The majority in Wright concluded that the plaintiffs did not prove that the
state made a racial classification because the minority group's geographic
82. lL, 84 S. Ct. at 612-13.
83. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313, 86 S. Ct. 803, 810 (1966).




location was another possible justification for the plan. The Voting Rights Act
was designed to put racial consideration above geographic consideration if.
necessary to give minorities voting power. The majority in Shaw took issue with
giving minority voting power priority over traditional districting principles. The
principle authority cited by the Court for this proposition was United Jewish
Organizations.
2. The Role of United Jewish Organizations
Plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizations were members of a Hasidic Jewish
community who were split into two districts as a result of New York's revised
redistricting plan. The challenged plan was a revision of New York's original
plan in response to the Attorney General's objection under Section 5.8' Plaintiffs
alleged that the revised plan would dilute their voting strength in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." The Court in Shaw distinguishes United
Jewish Organizations on the grounds that plaintiffs in United Jewish Organiza-
tions "did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it
rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race.
' 87
Thus, the distinction is simply that appearances do matter.
The plurality opinion in United Jewish Organizations is labeled by the
majority in Shaw as "highly fractured.,8 8 However, seven of the eight Justices
deciding United Jewish Organizations concluded that the use of racial criteria in
redistricting is not unconstitutional per se. Four Justices determined that
compliance with Section 5 of the Act is a sufficient justification for using race
in drawing district lines. 9 Three Justices held that the redistricting plan was
constitutional "[w]hether or not the plan was authorized by or was in compliance
with [ ] the Voting Rights Act" as long as the plan did not minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of any group.9' Two Justices thought the plaintiffs' claim
must fail as it failed to allege either a discriminatory purpose or effect. 9'
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion on the grounds that plaintiffs
should be allowed to adduce additional facts and the claim should not be
dismissed at the pleading stage. Given the lack of evidence, Chief Justice Burger
did not determine whether using racial criteria is permissible if done to comply
with the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act. However, his opinion
suggests that the state's action might be justified if it was "related" to or
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
86. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at 152-53, 97 S. Ct. at 1003.
87. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993).
88. lit
89. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at 155-65, 97 S. Ct. at 1004-09 (this
portion of the opinion was joined by Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens).
90. 1d. at 165, 97 S. Ct. at 1009 (this portion of the opinion was joined by Justices White,
Stevens, and Rehnquist).
91. 1d. at 180, 97 S. Ct. at 1016-17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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"necessary ... to fulfilling the State's obligation under the Voting Rights
Act."92
The majority in Shaw places great emphasis on the following closing
paragraph from United Jewish Organizations concerning compactness:
[W]e think it also permissible for a State, employing sound districting
principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to
prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating
districts that will afford fair representation to the members of those
racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential
patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will
be in the majority.93
The above paragraph contains the only reference to compactness in the entire
United Jewish Organizations opinion, in which only three Justices joined. The
Justices would place this limitation on states when they are not acting under the
purview of the Voting Rights Act. In other words, this limitation would not be
applicable to states acting under the constraints of the Act, such as North
Carolina in Shaw.
3. Satisfying the Test
More perplexing than the authority for the majority opinion are the "guide-
lines" on how states may satisfy the compelling interest test, assuming on
remand that the state is unable to contradict allegations of racial gerrymandering.
Although the Court does not explicitly address whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act would constitute a compelling interest, given the facts of this
case it would be anomalous for the Court to say that it would. However, the
Court intimates that it would draw the line between what the Voting Rights Act
requires and what it permits.'
Finally, the Court addresses whether avoiding dilution of black voting
strength in violation of Section 2 of the Act or eradicating the effects of past
racial discrimination would constitute a compelling interest. The Court does not
develop either of the above issues. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly requires
a factual foundation of vote dilution or past racial discrimination to constitute a
compelling interest.95
A successful vote dilution challenge under Section 2 to a single member
district requires proof of three threshold conditions: "that the minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single
member district; that the minority group is politically cohesive; and that the
92. Id. at 183, 97 S. Ct. at 1019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. of Williams-
burgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at 168, 97 S. Ct. at 1011) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 2830.
.95. Id. at 2831-32.
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white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate."
9
To fashion a compelling state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial
discrimination the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary."' 97 The majority in Shaw would likely refer
to the opinion in United Jewish Organizations, in which only three Justices stated
that states have an interest in correcting the consequences of racial bloc voting
apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, to conclude that
remedying past racial discrimination would not constitute a compelling state
interest. The opinion that discusses states' interests apart from compliance with
the Voting Rights Act is arguably the opinion that requires compactness.9"
Therefore, since compliance with the Voting Rights Act is unlikely to constitute
a compelling state interest, and since the other two alternatives require a showing
that the minority group is geographically compact, absent a showing of
compactness, the state will not prevail.99
4. Shaw's Diversion from the Jurisprudence
Well-settled jurisprudence under the Voting Rights Act prior to Shaw
illustrates that it is difficult to find an unconstitutional plan that is drawn in
response to a violation of the Voting Rights Act.'0° Absent total exclusion from
the electoral process or vote dilution, no discriminatory purpose or effect
constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Discriminatory purpose in
the voting rights area is a difficult proof problem because distilling legislative
96. Id. at 2831 (quotingThorburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 2766-67
(1986)). Thornburg dealt with multimember districts. These conditions were applied to single-
member districts in two recent cases. See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993);
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993).
97. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 109 S. Ct. 706, 725 (1989)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1849 (1986)).
98. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Corey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68, 97 S. Ct. 996,
1011 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
99. The majority opinion contains some language that impliedly suggests that North Carolina,
by disguising the plan as a remedy to a violation of the Voting Rights Act, is actually furthering
racial discrimination. The majority remarks that "[ilt is unsettling how closely the North Carolina
plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,
2824 (1993). What the majority suggests is that it considers this redistricting plan to be on a par
with that created by the Redeemers in Mississippi during Reconstruction. The "Mississippi
Redeemers concentrated the bulk of the black population in a 'shoestring' Congressional district
running the length of the Mississippi River. leaving five others with white majorities." Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 at 590 (1988).
100. The only two categories, prior to Shaw, in which constitutional violations have been found
in the voting rights arena are total exclusion from the voting process, see, e.g., Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926 (1915) (deprivation of right to vote by means of literacy test),
and vote dilution, see, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980) (voting practice
adversely affects strength of various groups). Shaw adds an amorphous third category.
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intent is an arduous task (assuming that it even exists). The requirement of
proving discriminatory purpose was specifically removed from Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act by the 1982 Amendments. 10' Given the recognized difficulty
of finding discriminatory purpose and the absence of traditional discriminatory
effect in Shaw, (total exclusion or vote dilution) the majority grounds the
plaintiffs' claim on the aesthetically unpleasing nature of the district.
Whether the majority in Shaw abandons the requirement of discriminatory
purpose and effect is questionable. On the one hand, the plaintiffs did not allege
vote dilution. The majority clearly states that the plaintiffs have stated a cause
of action that is entirely distinct from a vote dilution case. Shaw is simply a race
case and this "analytically distinct claim" does not require a showing of
discriminatory purpose or effect.
On the other hand, the Court implies that the required elements of purpose
and effect are satisfied without having been plead. The discriminatory purpose
is found in the shape of the district itself.' 2 The Court justifies its finding of
purpose by stating that: "No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when
the racial classification appears on the face of the statute."' 0
3
The effect is stated by the majority as: "It reinforces racial stereotypes and
threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
constituency as a whole."'" The Court recognizes that racial stigmatism and
undermining representative democracy is not the kind of harm traditionally
required in vote dilution cases. Therefore, the Court is either implicitly
recognizing racial stigmatism and undermining representative democracy as a
cognizable harm, or it is dispensing with this requirement. Which of the above
is the correct answer is left to the imagination of the reader.
The majority unjustifiably removed the barriers to plaintiffs' challenges
under the Voting Rights Act (that is, the requirement of discriminatory purpose
and effect) by creating a new cause of action that, on the face of the opinion, is
easily satisfied. The dissenters condemned the majority for its abandonment of
prior precedent and lack of authority for its holding.
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Each dissenter in Shaw objects to the creation of this "analytically distinct
claim."'0° Historically, the only two types of voting cases in which courts have
determined that plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim are those in which one's
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
102. Given the context of redistricting-politics and government-this argument has some merit.
It is not implausible to say that voters are less likely to trust something that is distorted and
suspicious than something that is compact and traditional.
103. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
104. 1&. at 2828.
105. Id. at 2830.
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right to vote is denied or diluted."° The dissent characterizes this case as a vote
dilution claim which necessitates evidence of discriminatory purpose and
effect-because of the nature of the redistricting process-to state a claim. What
is specifically required is evidence that "the political processes ... were not
equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
10 7
The majority recognizes that proving discriminatory purpose and effect is not
an easy task; but this severe burden was "adopted for sound reasons."' 08 The
central reason lies in the "nature of the redistricting process."'" Accordingly,
that one's candidate loses at the polls in a given election is not sufficient to
constitute discriminatory effect."0 That one's candidate will lose is simply in the
nature of the political process. The dissent concludes that the "threshold require-
ment""' of discriminatory effect is absent given that white voters constitute
seventy-six percent of the total population and seventy-nine percent of the voting
age population in North Carolina; yet they constitute a majority in eighty-three
percent of the congressional districts."'
According to the dissent, discriminatory purpose is precluded because North
Carolina was attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Furthermore, if
the state must satisfy strict scrutiny, compliance with the Act constitutes a
compelling state interest."'
The dissent raises an interesting problem with satisfying the majority's
requirement of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the statute be narrowly
tailored to meeting the state's interest. This leaves open the question, what state
interest is the Court referring to? As the dissent frames it: "Is it more 'narrowly
tailored' to create an irregular majority-minority district as opposed to one that
is compact but harms other State interests such as incumbency protection or the
representation of rural interests?"" 4
The dissent recognizes the conflicting interest of compliance with the Voting
Rights Act and adhering to traditional districting principles. With the enactment
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress had "ruled" on how the conflict
should be resolved. Well-settled jurisprudence supports the dissent's conclusion.
The majority-unlike the dissent-fails to reach the ultimate issue: whether the
106. See supra note 99.
107. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
766, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 2339 (1973)).
108. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166,97 S. Ct. 996,
1010 (plurality opinion); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-34, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2808-
11 (1986) (comparable analysis of political gerrymandering claim).
111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2838.




Court can mandate that states adhere to traditional districting principles in the
reapportionment process when complying with the Voting Rights Act without
amending or declaring the Act unconstitutional.
D. The Balancing Test
The majority attempts to strike a balance between the protection of minority
voters and the adherence to traditional districting principles. Given the unusual
shape of some districts, one might conclude that the balance has weighed heavily
in favor of protecting minority interests. However, this conclusion would ignore
the states' other legitimate interests, such as incumbency and partisan politics,
that clearly play an important role in redistricting.
In United Jewish Organizations, Justice Brennan best described the need to
weigh and balance and the function of the Voting Rights Act in this process:
[I]f and when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy of benign racial
sorting, he must weigh the concerns that I have discussed against the
need for effective social policies promoting racial justice in a society
beset by deep-rooted racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here
adequately struck that balance in enacting the carefully conceived
remedial scheme embodied in the Voting Rights Act."'
The concerns that Justice Brennan refers to are essentially the same concerns of
the Shaw majority. They are:
(1) that a purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise
a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's
supposed beneficiaries; (2) an explicit policy of assignment by race may
serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the
utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no
relationship to an individual's worth or needs; and (3) that even a
benign policy of assignment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our
society, especially by those individuals who are adversely affected by
a given classification." 6
The consideration that Justice Brennan gives to these concerns evinces that they
were taken into account in creating the Voting Rights Act. Thus, the majority
in Shaw has no cause for disregarding the Voting Rights Act under the pretense
of guarding against these concerns.
The majority sees polarized voting as an evil in our democratic system, yet
they offer no alternative to the protection of minority interests. A balance must
be struck by deciding, inter alia, which is the greater harm: the acceptance of
115. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 175, 97 S. Ct. 996,
1014-15 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
116. Id at 172-74, 97 S. Ct. at 1013-14.
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polarized voting or the denial of minorities of their constitutional right of equal
representation in the electoral system.
Balanced against the need to protect minority voting rights are the political
forces inherent in redistricting and a group of well-settled practices commonly
referred to as traditional districting principles.
1. Incumbency Protection and Partisan Politics
Redistricting plans are drawn by legislators who are driven by partisan
politics. One very common objective in designing new districts is the protection
of incumbents. Indeed, North Carolina's second majority-minority district could
have been fashioned so as not to appear as "bizarre," but at the expense of
endangering an incumbent democratic representative, "a favorite of the House
leadership."".7  Although the Supreme Court has never declared that the
protection of incumbents is not a legitimate state interest, Shaw demands that this
state interest, as well as others, not be satisfied at the expense of traditional
districting principles. The fear that the majority in Shaw foresees is best
described in a Wall Street Journal article describing North Carolina's first
redistricting plan: "The drawing of district lines is an inherently political act,
and nothing can change that. But the worst abuses must end. Gerrymandering
subverts the democratic process as effectively as a poll tax or physical
intimidation. By entrenching incumbents in office, gerrymanders destroy the idea
of political competition."".. After the perverse Twelfth District was submitted
in the revised plan, a follow-up article went on to conclude: "The lengths to
which incumbents will go to protect their power and turf know no bounds.




Generally the mechanism for protecting incumbents is through partisan
politics. It is well known that partisan politics play an important role in
redistricting and are often one of the most important if not the sole reason for the
results of most districting plans. North Carolina's decision to locate the Twelfth
District in its current location resulted from this political dynamic. The second
majority-minority district suggested by the Attorney General, which was to be
located in the south-central to southeast part of the state, would have arguably
been more compact. However, it was rejected by the Democratic General
117. Thou shalt not injure an incumbent. North Carolina could easily have drawn a much
more compact district that still would have made highly probable the election of a black
member of Congress, but drawing it would have taken some reliable Democratic voters
from the district of Representative Charles Rose. Heaven forfend. Dilute the almost
perfect security of a man who came to Washington in 1972 and thus enjoys the most
revered entitlement America can offer, incumbency? Not a chance.
George F. Will, Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberative Democracy
50 (1992). See also Political Pornography-II, supra note 33 , at A14.
118. Political Pornography, supra note 36, at A10.
119. Political Pornography.Il, supra note 33, at A14.
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Assembly. The Republicans' suit alleging a political gerrymander was
dismissed. °
2. The Requirement of Compactness
The Shaw majority clearly intimates a curtailment of the states' interests in
incumbency and partisan politics if satisfying these interests is at the expense of
traditional districting principles. The traditional districting principle that most
concerns the majority is compactness. The requirement of compactness is neither
a constitutional nor a statutory mandate; nowhere do the words "compactness"
or "contiguity" or any synonymous terms appear in the Voting Rights Act.
Compactness is a creature of the jurisprudence and its support can be found in
what one generally thinks of as traditional districting principles.
Traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and
political subdivisions draw their support from the same source as fundamental
rights, that is, these principles are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."' 2' Districts that adhere to long-standing political boundaries and
communities of interest in the geographical sense are what we have come to
expect in the electoral process.
The dissent in Shaw limits the lack of compactness to an evidentiary
"presumption." In stating that "while district irregularities may provide strong
indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that,"'22 the dissenting
Justices thwart the importance of traditional districting principles. Suggesting
that compactness is unimportant is foolish. The majority of the voting public is
less concerned with whether a district passes constitutional muster than they are
with receiving adequate representation from elected officials. Voters may
logically conclude that their elected representative cannot provide adequate
representation in a district shaped similar to that at issue in Shaw given limited
resources and logistical problems. If voters think that they are not being :
adequately represented, public support for and participation in government will
decline. Trust in government and in the electoral system is essential to a
representative democracy, and when it comes to what the public is willing to
trust, appearances do matter.
V. THE LOUISIANA CASE: HAYS V. LOUISIANA' 23 .
A federal district court in Louisiana was forced to apply what little guidance
the Supreme Court had provided in Shaw to the merits of a case challenging the
constitutionality of Louisiana's Fourth Congressional District. The facts peculiar
120. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
121. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977).
122. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2841 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
123. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
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(but maybe not so uncommon) to this case allowed the panel to reach a
conclusion without having to fully interpret Shaw.
A. The Facts of Hays
As a result of a population decrease reported in the 1990 Census, Louisi-
ana's Congressional delegation was reduced by one member. In response, the
legislature passed Act 42 during the 1992 Regular Session of the Legislature
which reapportioned Louisiana voters into seven districts.'24 The reapportion-
ment plan was designed to increase the number of black representatives from one
out of eight to two out of seven. The second majority black district created was
District 4.
Immediately, voters challenged the plan created by Act 42 by seeking an
injunction to halt the 1992 elections under the plan. The injunction was denied,
the court took under advisement the Voting Rights Act claim made by the
plaintiffs, and the elections proceeded. One year after the Louisiana Legislature
passed Act 42, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Shaw v. Reno.
The federal district court reasoned that Shaw resuscitated the Equal Protection
claims originally brought by the plaintiffs, and ordered additional briefs and an
evidentiary hearing addressing Shaw.
Hays v. Louisiana falls squarely within the ambit of Shaw v. Reno. 
12
Plaintiffs are black, white, and Asian residents of Districts 4 and 6. They allege
that the plan created by Act 42, and specifically District 4, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The three-judge panel in
Shreveport held that "the Plan in general and Louisiana's Congressional District
4 in particular are the products of racial gerrymandering and are not narrowly
tailored to further any compelling governmental interest."' 2 6
B. The District Court's Analysis Under Shaw
In Shaw, the Court held that voters stated a claim by alleging that the
challenged reapportionment plan was so bizarre "that it [could] only be
understood as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because
of their race."' 27 The Court concluded that once plaintiffs state a claim, the
burden shifts to the state to prove that the plan is not a racial gerrymander. If
the state cannot prove as much, the plan will be subject to strict scrutiny; the
state must then demonstrate a compelling state interest and that the plan is
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.12
124. 1992 La. Acts No. 42.
125. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1193.
126. Id. at 1191.
127. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
128. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1194, 1198.
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1. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under Shaw
Just as one would expect after reading the opinion in Shaw, the physical
appearance of a district is the major determinate of whether plaintiffs state a
claim. District 4 is the primary focus of this constitutional challenge and its
shape leaves little doubt that this type of district is precisely what Shaw does not
allow.
The plan adopted in 1992 to create an additional majority-minority district
disregards parish lines by splitting twenty-eight parishes into more than one
congressional district, whereas the former plan only divided seven parishes.' 29
District 4 itself encompasses twenty-eight parishes and only four parishes are
included within the district in their entirety. The district also includes portions
of all major municipalities in the state with the exceptions of New Orleans and
Lake Charles.13
Comparing the shape of the challenged district in Shaw to District 4, it
would be difficult, given the emphasis placed on physical appearance by the
Supreme Court, to conclude that plaintiffs here have not stated a claim that the
"Z-shaped" District 4 was a violation of equal protection. However, the question
of whether the plan was a product of racial gerrymandering involves a more
difficult analysis of the majority's opinion in Shaw.
2. The Plan is a Product of Racial Gerrymandering
The Hays court adopts the following definition of racial gerrymandering
from Wright v. Rockefeller: "intentionally draw[ing] one or more districts along
racial lines or otherwise intentionally segregat[ing] citizens into voting districts
based on their race."' 3' This definition requires no discriminatory intent. It
is difficult to conceive of a case that arises under the Voting Rights Act that will
not satisfy this liberal definition. It is no secret that a legislature must
intentionally use race in the redistricting process in order to avoid Section 2
129. Id at 1200.
130. d at 1201. The majority calls District 4 an "un-district," id., and describes it as follows:
It begins north of Shreveport-in the northwestern corner of Louisiana, just east of the
Texas border and flush against the Arkansas border-and sweeps east along that border,
periodically extending pseudopods southward to engulf small pockets of black voters, all
the way to the Mississippi River. The district then turns south and meanders down the
west bank of the Mississippi River in a narrow band, gobbling up more and more black
voters as it goes. As it nears Baton Rouge, the district juts abruptly east to swallow
predominantly black portions of several more parishes. Simultaneously, it hooks in a
northwesterly arc, appropriating still more black voters on its way to Alexandria, where
it selectively includes only predominantly black residential neighborhoods. Finally, at its
southern extremity, the district extends yet another projection-this one westward towards
Lafayette-adding still more concentrations of black residents.
Id. at 1199-1200. See infra Appendix B for a map of the district.
131. Id. at 1194.
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violations of the Act or to gain preclearance under Section 5. Given plaintiffs'
light burden of establishing a racial gerrymander, it is likely that the analysis of
claims brought under the Voting Rights Act will focus immediately on the
question of a compelling governmental interest and whether the plan is narrowly
tailored.
I The court in Hays spends much time discussing how racial gerrymandering
may be proven inferentially.' 32 It later concludes that this is not necessary here
given the direct evidence of racial gerrymandering. 33 When the original trial
was conducted in 1992, no one disputed that Act 42 was designed to create a
second majority black district. The state perceived that the second district was
necessary for Section 5 preclearance. The state did not contest that the plan was
a product of racial gerrymandering. Before Shaw, constructing district lines
based on race was permissible to gain compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
After Shaw was decided, the state attempted to prove that other factors
influenced the reapportionment scheme, specifically partisan/incumbent politics
and socioeconomic commonalities. The court dismisses these "defenses" as




Unfairly, the court scowls at the fact that "[a]t-the Trial [(which occurred
before Shaw was handed down)], the Defendants never suggested that partisan
or incumbent politics played a role in the determination to create District 4."'135
Given the state of the law before Shaw, the state had no reason to offer any
evidence regarding alternative explanations for the shape of the district. The
state has the disadvantage of time to contend with. Had this plan been adopted
after the Court's ruling in Shaw, the legislature could have formulated non-racial
explanations for the plan and avoided the charge of presenting "post hoc
rationalizations."
Besides the pretextual charge rendered against these two defenses, the court
concludes that even if the state had genuinely submitted them as rationalizations
for the redistricting plan, they would have been insufficient for two reasons:
first, they were not established factually; and second, the state could not prove
that they totally excluded race as a factor.'36
The court limits its treatment of the incumbency justification to a footnote
and concludes that the justification is "irrelevant."'' 37 Testimony indicated that
to protect the existing districts (and the existing representatives of those districts),
the shape of District 4 was pushed North to the Arkansas border and East to the
Mississippi River. This constitutes a large portion of District 4, and more
importantly, a large portion of the reason why the district could be called
"bizarre." If protecting incumbents was the partial reason for the shape of the
132. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1197-1204.
133. Id. at 1205.
134. Id. at 1201.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1201-04.
137. Id. at 1201 n.43.
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district (which the court does not seem to dispute), one could hardly agree that
the justification of incumbency protection is "irrelevant."' ' 38
The state offered evidence on the socioeconomic commonality and coherence
of District 4 and demonstrated that, relative to the other six districts, the citizens
of District 4 were the poorest, least educated, and owned fewer telephones and
automobiles. 39 This evidence was offered to prove that: (1) the district was
based on something other than race; (2) the state had a compelling interest in
creating a district to represent the poor citizens of the state; and (3) to dispute
the finding that the district did not adhere to the traditional districting principle
of commonality of interests and was thus not narrowly tailored."4
The court discounts the expert testimony on commonality of interest as
"spurious," concluding that District 4 includes the poorest and least educated
citizens precisely because it is packed with black people. 4 ' As the court
states: "racially gerrymandered plans, which seek to draw boundaries around
various concentrations of black persons, will inevitably tend to concentrate the
poorer, less well-educated blacks."'1
42
That the court factually finds the two proffered explanations of the defendant
unconvincing is less troubling than the court's dicta that even if it had accepted
these two alternative explanations as sufficient to meet the defendant's burden
of proof, it still would have concluded that District 4 was a racial gerrymander
because race was a factor in designing the district. The district court interprets
the language in Shaw to mean that plaintiffs need only establish that race was an
"important" factor in the creation of the district while defendants must prove that
the plan can be "wholly explained to be the product of one or more factors other
than race."' 4
3
It is undisputable that the plaintiff's burden should be to prove only that race
was an important factor in redistricting. It is difficult to conceive of a situation
in which race will be the only factor. Nonetheless, a situation in which a
redistricting plan wholly disregards race as a factor is likewise inconceivable.
This court has imposed an unfair burden on the state which is untrue to
Shaw-to totally exclude race as a factor in redistricting-while permitting
plaintiffs to engage in a type of balancing test. A solution to this inequity is to
allow the state to engage in a balancing test of its own, to prove that although
race played a factor in the process, there were other factors operating that also
influenced the shape of the district. The logical conclusion of the court's
interpretation of Shaw is that if race was a factor in redistricting (which will be
one hundred percent of the time in Voting Rights Act cases) the state will have
to satisfy strict scrutiny. Why the Supreme Court would afford the state the
138. The court did not discuss partisan politics as a separate issue.
139. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. La. 1993).
140. Id. at 1203 & n.47.
141. Id. at 1203 n.48.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1202 & n.46 (emphasis added).
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intermediate step of establishing that the district was not based on race alone,
thus avoiding the rigorous test of strict scrutiny, when this would fail in one
hundred percent of the cases, is perplexing. The district court cites no authority
for its proposition.
3. The Plan Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny
"The bedrock principle underlying the Court's decision in Shaw is that
racially gerrymandered redistricting plans are subject to the same strict scrutiny
that applies to other state legislation classifying citizens on the basis of
race."' " This statement explains why the court cut through the intermediate
step described above to reach the question of strict scrutiny. However, this
overly definitive statement of the district court goes beyond what appears on the
face of Shaw; nevertheless, it is a justifiable interpretation of the vague language
of the majority's opinion in Shaw.
a. Compelling Governmental Interest
To support its claim, the state advanced four possible compelling state
interests: "(1) conformity with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, (2)
conformity with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, (3) proportional representa-
tion of Louisiana blacks in Congress, and (4) remedying the effects of past racial
discrimination."'' 45 The court does not decide whether any of the above is a
compelling state interest because it resolves the case on the ground that even if
a compelling state interest were established, the plan was not narrowly tailored
to satisfy any such interest.1
The court spends much time discussing that in its view, District 4 (or any
second majority-minority district) was not required by the Attorney General's
office; therefore, the issue of whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act
would be a compelling state interest if the plan were required to comply with the
Act remains an important and unanswered question.
According to the court, the plan enacted by Act 42 containing two majority-
minority districts would only be required by the Attorney General's Office if
failure to include District 4 would have violated either Section 2147 or Section
5t48 of the Voting Rights Act. A violation of Section 2 (vote dilution) can
only be established if members of a cognizable racial group establish that they
are numerous and geographically compact enough to constitute a majority in a
144. Id at 1194.
145. Id at 1205-06.
146. Id. at 1206-09.
147. See supra note 11 for text of statute.
148. See supra note 17 for text of statute.
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single district. 49 District 4 could never meet the requirement of geographical
compactness.
Louisiana is a "covered" jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Act and
therefore either needs preclearance by the Justice Department or a judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia stating that any
changes in voting practice or procedure meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§1973c. Section 5 of the Act only requires that changes in voting practices and
procedures not have a retrogressive effect on racial minorities with respect to
their participation in the electoral franchise.' 5° Act 42 actually increases the
number of districts in which blacks would constitute a majority from one of eight
to two of seven-an increase in representation. Section 5 only requires a
maintenance of the status quo.
The state believed that the Attorney General's Office would not preclear the
plan without two majority-minority districts. Letters from the Office of the
Assistant Attorney General responding to redistricting plans for the Louisiana
Senate and the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education indicating a need
for an increase in minority representation led legislators to believe that the
Attorney General would require the same for congressional districts.' 5' The
state failed to pass a redistricting plan during the 1991 Regular Session of the
Legislature; thus, to hold the 1992 elections timely, it was imperative that the
devised plan pass the 1992 Regular Session and meet preclearance requirements.
Thus, District 4 was included.
The court places too much emphasis on whether a second majority-minority
district was required by the Attorney General's Office. Arguably, there will
never be a plan that is indisputably required by the Voting Rights Act. Even if
Louisiana had disputed whether a second majority-minority district was necessary
to comply with the Voting Rights Act, such a challenge would have been
impractical. The procedural costs and time delays required to challenge a
determination of the Attorney General are unfeasible for most states. The court
here ignores the efficiency gained by following.the directives of the Attorney
General's Office.
Majority-minority districts, even though not required by either Sections 2 or
5, are not per se prohibited.152 If a state is able to prove that the challenged
district was required to comply with the Voting Rights Act (if this is possible),
it remains an open question whether this would constitute a compelling
governmental interest. Furthermore, a plan enacted to comply with the Act is
more likely to be considered narrowly tailored to the governmental interest of
complying with the Voting Rights Act.
149. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993) (extending the requirements for stating a
dilution claim for multimember districts to single-member districts).
150. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363-64 (1976).
151. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1196 n.21 (W.D. La. 1993).




The Hays court assumes, arguendo, that all of the proffered state interests
would satisfy the requirement of a compelling governmental interest. The court
ultimately determines District 4 to be unconstitutional because the plan enacted
by Act 42 was not narrowly tailored to meet any proffered governmental interest.
The court's specific objections are that the plan "entails considerably more
segregation than is necessary to satisfy the need for a second black majority
district" and "excessively burdens a variety of third party interests.' 53 Stated
differently, the court finds alternatives to the plan that includes District 4 in its
current state. If alternatives exist, the plan is not narrowly tailored and it fails
strict scrutiny.
The obvious alternative here is a plan with only one majority-minority
district since arguably compliance with the Act did not require the creation of a
second district. Also, the court surveys other majority-minority districts to
determine what percentage of voting-age blacks was required to realistically elect
a black candidate. The court determined that the percentage of blacks in District
4, sixty-three percent, packed more blacks into the district than was reasonably
necessary to elect a black candidate.'" Lastly, the court determines that the
boundaries of District 4 violated traditional districting principles more than was
necessary.' As the court states, "the Legislature could have developed and
adopted a redistricting plan--even one with a second majority black district-that
reflected greater respect for traditional redistricting criteria and that was less
disruptive to the traditional political, social, economic, ethnic, geographical, and
religious organization of the State."' 56
A state will rarely satisfy the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny
test because there will almost always be an alternative district that could have
been drawn giving more respect to traditional districting principles; and it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court of the United States will reduce its emphasis on
the importance of these principles. The problem for state legislatures is that
traditional districting principles rarely coincide with traditional political practices
of the state.
C. What Hays adds to Shaw v. Reno
Hays v. State of Louisiana is not a case in which the challenged plan was
required by the Voting Rights Act. It is possible that most cases will not be
"required" by the Act and, therefore, this type of analysis might be what we can
expect from the district courts as Shaw's progeny.
153. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1207.
154. Id. at 1207-08.
155. Id. at 1208-09.
156. Id. at 1209.
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What Hays does tell us is that the court will apply strict scrutiny once a
racial gerrymander is found, which will be one hundred percent of the time in
Voting Rights Act cases. Whether a court will sustain as a compelling state
interest one of those articulated by the defendants here under a stronger factual
situation remains uncertain. It is likely, however, that if the court determines
that an alternative existed to the challenged plan that would have more closely
adhered to traditional districting principles, the plan will fail to be narrowly
tailored. The result of a case like Hays being tried on the merits under Shaw is
that states that use race as a factor in redistricting must satisfy strict scrutiny,
despite what the Voting Rights Act requires.'57
VI. CONCLUSION
Through its use of ambiguous language and symbolic quotations, the
majority in Shaw v. Reno clouds a simple solution that it refuses to recognize.
If there is a factual finding that minorities are being denied equal access to the
electoral system (discriminatory effect) and there exists polarized voting in the
jurisdiction, a remedy should be fashioned under the Voting Rights Act, taking
race into account. Otherwise, the Voting Rights Act must be declared
unconstitutional.
Yet the Court intentionally clouds this simple solution to address the issue
of racial segregation in general. In both Shaw and Hays, the parties on each side
of the litigation attempt to achieve similar goals. Both sides envision an electoral
process in which every individual is afforded an equal opportunity to affect the
electoral system. The difference emerges when it comes to the means of
reaching this goal. Plaintiffs feel that society has developed to a point where we
do not need government intervention protect minorities' right to vote. In their
view, we have reached a stage where racial stigmas and polarized voting no
longer exist. On the other hand, the state would continue to protect minority
involvement in voting under the Voting Rights Act, because in their view, we
have not achieved a "color-blind society." The state chooses the path of the
Voting Rights Act to create districts in which minorities are able to elect
candidates of their choice. The judicial and legislative history of the Act seems
to support their view. The plaintiffs, having failed under the Voting Rights Act,
have successfully gone the way of the Constitution. The next stage for the Court
is to resolve the conflict it has created between the Voting Rights Act and what
the Court determines the Constitution requires. The parties in Shaw and Hays
are closer than they might realize when it comes to what they hope to achieve.
It is simply the means on which they disagree.
Tricia Ann Martinez
157. As a result of Hays, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the plan depicted in Appendix C
during the 1994 Regular Session.
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